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In its first-ever global “security strategy ”, presented by Javier Solana, High Representative for 
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), and meanwhile confirmed by the 
heads of state and government of the EU at the European Council in Thessaloniki on June 
19-20, 2003, the EU has now recognized and confirmed new global security threats (i.e. 
international terrorism and proliferation of mass destruction weapons). It brings the EU’s 
security concerns broadly in line with that of the United States. This highly important 
document is serving as the basis for a officially declared European Security Strategy to be 
adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The new strategy is explicitly calling for 
extending the zone of security around Europe and to develop strategic partnerships not just 
with the United States, Canada and Japan, but also with China and India due to their 
important security role “in their respective regions and beyond”. In another new key 
document, the Declaration of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU has 
outlined its key policy objective of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) as well 
as its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), “to deter, halt and, where possible, 
reverse proliferation programs of concern worldwide.” For the very first time, it does no 
longer exclude the use of force as a last resort and the most extreme coercive measure if 
political and diplomatic measures have failed. In this regard, the EU is developing and 
implementing an EU Action Plan as a matter of priority. Furthermore, in another declaration 
concerning the ambivalent nature of Iran’s civilian nuclear program, it is not only warning 
Teheran to develop and acquire nuclear weapons, for the very first time the EU is even 
threatening Iran to suspend its economic trade and cooperation programs. 
While the EU also recognizes the importance of traditional arms control regimes, national 
export controls and even coercive measures in accordance with the UN charter as important 
instruments to shape international relations, it simultaneously sees none as sufficient in itself.  
For more than 30 years, the policy arena of nuclear arms control remained very stable. 
Throughout this period, “arms control” had been defined as carefully negotiated multilateral 
or bilateral agreements with legally binding measures to implement them. The historical 
record of international arms control efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), however, is rather mixed. On the one hand, previous forecasts of 20 
nuclear powers by 1970 made in the 1960s by U.S. experts have never become true. The 
number had reached nine by 1990, including four undeclared nuclear powers (Israel, 
Pakistan, India, and South Africa). In addition, shortly afterwards, South Africa decided to 
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dismantle its six nuclear bombs.  Moreover, in the first half of the 1990s, a horizontal nuclear 
proliferation after the implosion of the former Soviet Union (FSU) with new emerging nuclear 
powers on its territory (such as Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) has been successfully 
prevented.  
On the other hand, several strategic developments in recent years have called the former 
arms control agenda and traditional mechanisms and instruments into question. The new 
US-administration, for instance, has from the very beginning (and not just after September 
11, 2001) broken with the former arms control philosophy by emphasizing often unilateral 
actions and by discarding arms control mechanisms, agreements and regimes that might 
contradict US security interests. But it has also announced reductions in U.S. strategic 
nuclear forces to a level of 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads, and declared on December 13, 
2001 its intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty within six 
months. The Bush-government interpreted the ABM-treaty as a relic of the Cold War which 
hampers the ability of the United States to defend itself (BMD). Therewith, the offensive-
defensive arms control approach struck 30 years ago that enabled considerable reductions in 
strategic offensive nuclear forces over time, has been given up. It has sparked widespread 
fears  of an return to the old arms race paradigm — albeit those fears are overdrawn and 
ultimately unrealistic in regard to a new US-Russian arms race. 
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), delivered to the Congress in January 2002 and 
explained to the public since March 2002, calls to draft contingency plans for the use of 
nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, naming the “axis of evil” — Iraq, Iran, and 
North Korea — but also Libya and Syria and even Russia and China. To some extent, it also 
reverses an almost two-decade-long trend of relegating nuclear weapons to the category of 
weapons of last resort and redefines nuclear requirements in post-September 11 terms. In 
the same month, President Bush stated: “In preventing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, there is nor margin for error and no chance to learn from mistakes. Our coalition 
must act deliberately, but inaction is not an option. Men with no respect for life must never be 
allowed to control the ultimate instruments of death.” 
Most recently, however, the Bush-administration announced plans for initiating a research 
and development program of a new generation of small tactical nuclear arms to destroy 
enemy deep buried bunkers to dissuade nuclear threshold states from ever building deep 
bunkers. But whether these plans will really stop the proliferation by deterring nuclear  
threshold states or whether the new plans will rather fasten proliferation of WMD is open for 
discussion. But the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have definitively weakened 
further all international arms control efforts, non-proliferation regimes and existing verification 
as well international inspections measures. 
Furthermore, war against international terrorism in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the 
continuing nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan, the recent invasion of Iraq, and the 
ongoing nuclear stalemate on the Korean Peninsula have raised the question whether the 
former existing arms control philosophy is still adequate and relevant towards the new rising 
security challenges and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons (MDW; including 
ballistic missiles). Are the more informal, unilateral arms control measures of the U.S. and its 
efforts to fight WMD with WMD are a more adequate and sufficient instrument to cope with 
the new global and regional security challenges? In general it seems that we could manage 
the processes but not to stop them always and entirely. The reason therefore is simply: 
availability. The more states have WMD, the more available becomes the necessary 
technology and know how on the global scale — in particular for non-state terrorist groups 
and organizations. Consequently, new vulnerabilities have been exposed in a way with the 
September 11, 2001 attacks that were not appreciated previously to a sufficient extent. The 
newly established distribution networks, for instance, consisting of lesser-developed nations 
(also called “secondary proliferators” such as North Korea and Iran), could help other 
countries to circumvent existing non-proliferation regimes to obtain the materials and 
equipment needed to develop nuclear weapons. 
In this light, of contradicting trends in the field of global arms control and non-proliferation 
policies, I will at first analyze the recent SORT-Treaty of May 2002 and take a look what has 
changed vis-à-vis the former SALT- and START-treaties between the United States and 
Russia because the future international arms control agenda and global non-proliferation 
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efforts depend very much on the stability and strategic cooperation between the U.S. and 
Russia. Then I will draw the attention to already disturbing trends in the proliferation of mass 
destruction weapons (particularly nuclear proliferation) since the second half of the 1990s by 
reviewing the MTCR and new initiatives to curb ballistic missile proliferation. It will be 
followed by an overview of the recent the nuclear stalemate on the Korean peninsula, the 
questions linked with WMD and the South Asian nuclear challenges. Finally, I will also 
address the nuclear terrorist challenge after September 11, 2001. 
 
The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty of May 2002: Prospects for Further Arms 
Control Negotiations? 
In regard to Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under the nuclear weapon states 
agreed toward eventual nuclear disarmament, downsizing the US and Russian strategic 
nuclear weapons arsenals is important for the viability and credibility of the Western non-
proliferation efforts to curb the global spread of WMD. 
The new Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty  (SORT), signed on 24 May 2002 between the 
US and Russian presidents at their Moscow summit meeting, will not change very much on 
Russia’s side in regard to its Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF).  But both sides agreed to cut 
their “operationally deployed strategic warheads” to 1,700-2,200 each — approximately two-
thirds from their present strategic nuclear arsenals over a 10-year period. The treaty, 
composed of just 485 words in five articles, however does not define which strategic 
warheads it covers (or what “operationally deployed strategic warheads” really mean. Indeed, 
Russia has a different interpretation) nor how those are to be counted.  The US side was 
primarily interested in as much flexibility as possible, including having the possibility to 
quickly re-deploy warheads which have been removed from delivery vehicles such as ballistic 
missiles and bombers.  By 2012, it is expected that the US will have deployed 2,200 strategic 
weapons and retain an additional 2,400 in an operationally maintained status of “responsive 
capability”.   
The final negotiations revealed on one hand the new strategic quality of the US-Russian 
relations after 11 September 2001, and on the other hand the following three facts which are 
often overlooked by Western critics of the SORT: 
1. The more Russia’s strategic nuclear forces have declined over the last decade, the more 
it is Russia (and not the US) that is primarily interested in an agreed treaty on the 
strategic nuclear forces of both sides as well as an inspection regime similar to the 
existing one for START-I.   
2. But simultaneously, the better the bilateral relationship develops between Washington 
and Moscow, the less important becomes the treaty for both sides. The strategic 
relationship between the US and Russia is already moving from one of Mutual Assured 
Destruction (MAD) of the Cold War period into one of Mutual Assured Security (MAS).  
Negotiated arms control then will have only residual importance. The Bush administration 
has already declared that it seeks a nuclear relationship with Russia similar to those 
between the US and its nuclear allies of Great Britain and France, where a strategic 
nuclear arms control or arms reduction treaty is no longer necessary.  
3. Interestingly, the critics of the new treaty in Moscow as well as in Washington and Europe 
seem to cling much more to the Cold War period and a mutual threat perception (or at 
least a lasting mutual mistrust) than those supporting the new treaty who are mostly 
concerned about very different threats in the world.   
But critics, too, admit that lowering the number of deployed warheads decreases the number 
of warheads ready for quick use — therewith reducing risks of an unauthorized or accidental 
launch due to Russia’s deteriorating early-warning capability. Nonetheless, it is 
understandable that Russia sought rules that would count warheads according to the 
maximum number any deployed delivery vehicle could carry similar to those of START-I.  
While the new SORT offers each side a much greater flexibility, at the same time it offers 
little predictability in regard to future strategic nuclear force structure — a central purpose of 
all former nuclear arms control treaties, but also the consequence of their former and to 
some extent still existing mutual threat perceptions.  In many ways, the warheads Russia 
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keeps in storage (not the ones it has deployed on its ICBMs, bombers, and submarines) may 
well be the greater nuclear threat to the United States. 
For Russia, the new treaty seems to offer a possibility it long has sought: to re-MIRV its 
ICBMs.  In the Russian view, the combination of the end of the operational lifetimes of more 
than 60 percent of Russia’s ICBMs, very low procurement rates of just 6-10 new missiles 
during the last four years and the transition to light ballistic missiles with single or few 
warheads, is leading to a radical decline in Russia’s SNF around 2010.  Therewith, a nuclear 
balance with a rising nuclear power such as China that has its own modernization program 
for strategic nuclear forces, including an expensive program to develop MIRV warheads for 
its new ICBMs and SLBMs after 2010 is only a question of time. However, given the 
operational lifetimes of its older SS-18, SS-19, SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs and the re-direction 
of financial resources away from strategic nuclear forces towards conventional forces, Russia 
might have only funds for re-MIRVing its new Topol-M ICBMs with three nuclear warheads in 
the future.  Given the present production rate of just two to six new ICBMs a year, Russia 
may only be able to increase its strategic nuclear arsenal of around 1,000 warheads by not 
more than 100-200 warheads before 2010-2015.  Even the new SORT, that allows a re-
MIRVing, thus will not solve the underlying structural problems of Russia’s future SNF but will 
just buy some limited time. In general, the criticism of many arms control adherents vis-à-vis 
SORT is in many ways overdrawn and does not take into account the completely changing 
security environment und mutual threat perceptions of both sides. Furthermore, the U.S., 
NATO and Russia have announced to work together on BMD and TMD. However, albeit a 
first-strike scenario is no longer the underlying threat assumption, both sides may need 
reassurance and mutual trust that only a robust transparency regime can provide. 
Furthermore, the Bush-administration's nuclear arms policies to discuss new weapons and 
an eventual resumption of nuclear testing may not really lead to a new arms race (Russia 
and China are unable to compete). However, it could make the task of banning the spread of 
nuclear weapons even more difficult that could severely threaten world security. In order to 
develop and produce them, testing would be required that by itself could trigger a global 
reaction cycle that would harm international security.  Both the PRC and Russia might 
resume testing and both seem already to wait that they can blame the US scraping the 
CTBT.  
Meanwhile, the PRC has surprisingly announced to be ready for talks on preventing an arms 
race in space even if they were not specifically aimed at a binding treaty. It was interpreted 
by the Chinese side as a major compromise aimed at injecting life into the long-stalled 
Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). Russia, which like the PRC had earlier 
argued -- in the face of US refusal -- for formal negotiations on a global agreement barring 
weaponry from space, hailed the PRC shift and told the 65-nation forum it would be ready to 
join in. Both powers, known to be deeply concerned over US plans for a Ballistic National 
Missile Defense system (BMD), said they hoped the move would clear the way for talks on 
space arms and other disarmament issues to get under way soon. Just a week ago in an 
obvious reference to NMD they told the CD, currently holding a three-months summer 
session, that the danger of "weaponization" of outer space was growing and had to be 
tackled promptly. There was no immediate response from the US but it seems rather unlikely 
that the Bush-administration will agree to such talks given the heavy dependence on its war-
fighting posture and BMD-plans on satellite-based reconnaissance, targeting and command 
and C4I. 
While another downsizing of the US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals look rather 
unlikely for the time being, sub-strategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons need to become a 
matter for discussion between both sides due to the dangers of terrorist thefts from insecure 
Russian arsenals and  lack of adequate safeguards in other nuclear weapon states (i.e. 
India, Pakistan and China). But given the relative and still increasing manifold weaknesses of 
Russia’s conventional armed forces and its first-use doctrine as well as the Bush 
administration’s new interest at least at a research and development program of new tactical 
nuclear warheads, it seems equally rather remote that the issue of sub-strategic nuclear 
weapons will return to the U.S.-Russian arms control dialogue in the foreseeable future. 
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Disturbing Strategic Trends in the Second Half of the 1990s 
In contrast to many positive developments in the field of global non-proliferation and 
denuclearization efforts in the first half of the 1990s, however, a number of other regional and 
global trends and their security implications put the goal of a nuclear free world in question, 
at least in near and mid-term perspective: 
(1) The implosion of the nuclear superpower USSR and the resulting proliferation problems 
have created new potential proliferation threats to both Europe and the Asia-Pacific 
region. Although any nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia seems nowadays more 
remote than ever, Russia is still facing numerous dismantling problems and costs that 
aggravate problems of reforming its armed forces and coping successfully with the 
challenges of the nuclear legacy of the former Soviet Union (“Cooperative Threat 
Reduction/CTR” programs). These challenges include the following two potential threats 
in the near future: a) increasing risks of the loss of command and control over nuclear 
weapons, both politically and militarily, that might lead to accidental or inadvertent and 
unsanctioned or unauthorized use of them; and b) an illicit export of nuclear materials and 
expertise to potential nuclear threshold countries. A very important  element of the CTR-
programs was preventing the leakage of material and technologies as well as equipment 
to sub-state actors in order to prevent them to proliferate those capabilities to nuclear 
state actors/threshold states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and others. A joint 
stewartship of their nuclear weapon stockpiles and disposition of Cold War-era nuclear 
weapons and materials will remain an important element in the joint US-Russia 
cooperation in the next decades. 
(2) Any proliferation of mass destruction weapons or even an unlimited proliferation of 
advanced conventional weapon systems and the increasing technology diffusion might 
fuel the already ongoing arms build-up and arms competition in East Asia. It could lead to 
an open arms race, increasing risks of misperception, miscalculation and 
misunderstanding and finally to a violent outbreak of potential conflicts, so undermining 
the stability and security in the region. Against this background, new potential proliferation 
threats must be addressed in the dynamic and highly fluid security landscape of the Asia-
Pacific region. The new security threats in this regard lies not just in the spread of WMD, 
but also in the “strategic cultures” of the second age nuclear powers such as India, 
Pakistan, North Korea and possibly also Iran. They are willing, for instance, to 
cannibalizing their conventional forces to finance their ballistic missile and WMD 
ambitions. In a major crisis, however, those efforts could erode the traditional restraints on 
the use of WMD  (such as to suing them earlier). 
(3) Although nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established in the South Pacific - such 
as the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga (the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone or 
SPNWFZ) and Southeast Asia (the 1995 South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone or 
SEANWFZ), it remains an open question whether they are effective instruments for 
successful regional and global non-proliferation policies. Ultimately, they are dependent 
on the support of the nuclear weapon states — the US, Russia, China, France and Great 
Britain — and their national security interests. These interests are not always and 
exclusively defined by broader regional or global security concerns but often to more 
narrow national security interests. Characteristically, the support of the nuclear powers for 
these two nuclear-weapon-free zones was and is still limited (SPNWFZ) or so far even 
non-existent (SEANWFZ). Given European experiences, nuclear-weapon-free zones 
might promote confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), but can hardly be the 
major or the only non-proliferation instrument. Therefore, the analysis of motivations and 
the internal as well as external security environment of potential nuclear threshold 
countries remains an important prerequisite for defining specific and successful non-
proliferation strategies. 
(4) Moreover, as the result of the dynamic economic growth and population increase in the 
Asia-Pacific region, the energy demand in the next decades will increase several times 
(particularly in China). Given the limited existence of energy resources, almost all states in 
East Asia are looking into the available options, notably the civilian use of nuclear power. 
But the creation of new nuclear power stations, nuclear fuel fabrication, spent fuel storage 
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and nuclear storage sites will raise considerable non-proliferation concerns because the 
boundaries between the civilian and military use of nuclear energy are often small.  
(5) Furthermore, new trends in Russia’s and China’s military policies indicate either a greater 
reliance on nuclear weapons both for prestige and compensating mounting deficiencies of 
its conventional forces or an accelerating modernization process (as it is the case in 
China). The latter might not only increase the accuracy of missiles and other technical 
parameter, but also expand its current nuclear arsenal two or three times in the next 10-15 
years.  
(6) Such a future nuclear arms build-up of China might also rise and justify nuclear ambitions 
of other East Asian countries, notably Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (or a unified Korea 
after the collapse of North Korea). Japan, for instance, is already confronted by ambitions 
of two de facto and one potential nuclear power (Russia, China and North Korea) in the 
Asia-Pacific Rim. It might have a direct or indirect impact on its security, particularly if the 
U.S. would withdraw from the region or if the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a positive security 
guarantee for Japan would loose its credibility. Moreover, the Indian-Pakistani nuclear 
arms race and their weaponry programs have also destabilizing effects on Southeast and 
Northeast Asian states because it threatens the crucial sea links for their trade and energy 
flows and undermines regional CSBMs. 
The expansion of technology that has an dominant influence in lives of most people presents 
certainly numerous benefits and opportunities, but at the same time it poses also new 
security challenges. The globalization of economies and technology availability provide new 
opportunities for terrorists with a power of modern weaponry and transnational links which 
are unprecedented in human experience. The example of the AUM-Shinrikyo Doomsday Cult 
and its use of chemical weapons in 1995 had already (and long before September 11, 2001)  
underscored those grave hazards with new dimensions. But it was the terrorists attacks on 
the World Trade  Center and the Pentagon that has changed the world and the conventional 
wisdom. They had profound impact on how in particular the United States views its 
vulnerability to terrorism — a changed threat perception which has affected a wide range of 
U.S. policies related to non-proliferation and traditional arms control. 
 
Containing Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
For many years, the proliferation of ballistic missiles has been a major international security 
concern. In the past, international efforts were centered on the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR), which has a mixed record. The MTCR — which is not a treaty that bans 
missiles —  has sought to curb missile proliferation by denying regional powers the 
technology to build ballistic missiles. According to UN statistics, currently at about 30 
countries possess missiles of different classes. After World War II, ballistic missiles were 
used in at least five different military conflicts and cruise missiles in nine cases. In the second 
half of the 1990s, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Israel tested successfully medium-
range missiles, whereas other states also have expanded their missile programs. These 
developments demonstrated the limits of the regime. Furthermore, North Korea has emerged 
in the 1990s as the leading missile exporter in the world: an estimated 400 Scud-B and –C 
missiles to Iran and Syria while Scud components (such as engines etc.) had been delivered 
to Egypt, Syria, Yemen and possibly Libya, as well as Nodong missiles and components to 
Pakistan and Iran. Moreover, although China has adopted new laws and has strengthened 
bureaucratic control of its arms exports, it is accused by the U.S. that Chinese companies 
continued to transfer missile-related industrial technology to Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria 
and Pakistan. 
MTCR members have meanwhile drafted the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation (ICCBM). In November 2002, 93 countries signed the code, which calls 
on states to make their missile development programs more transparent. Its most important 
provisions are two transparency-increasing CBM: 1. issuing annual declarations explaining 
their BM and space-launch vehicle policies; and 2. providing advance notice of missile and 
space rocket launches). In this regard, though these transparency measures can be seen as 
 7
a pragmatic instrument, they do not establish effective legal barriers and norms against 
missile possession, development, and testing. Furthermore, missile-possessing states such 
as China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria did not 
sign the code so far. Under these circumstances, the code’s CBMs are unlikely to stop the 
global missile proliferation. Whether the Russian proposal of a Global System of Control over 
the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies (GCS) in 1999 which also aims to 
raise transparency of Missile launches, providing security guarantees to states renouncing 
possession of missile delivery vehicles of WMD, encouraging and stimulating such states, 
and holding regular consultations in order to improve the system and to address disputed 
matters would really change the picture on ongoing proliferation activities by certain states is 
equally uncertain, but could at least improve the activities in the field of CBMs. 
 
The South Asian Nuclear Challenges 
The lifting of the Glenn, Pressler, and Symington Amendment sanctions on the U.S. side can 
be seen as the most significant indicator that the Bush-Administration has quietly accepted 
the fact that India is a nuclear weapon state. Even in the case that the Bush-Administration 
will not necessarily recognize India as an official nuclear weapon state, India will be treated 
one. This important US shift should not be explained primarily by the September 11 events of 
2001 but rather in the already earlier started shifts of US foreign and security policy vis-à-vis 
India (the decision to lift the sanctions was taken before September 11 because the US also 
felt the sanctions simply were not working). Pakistan, by contrast, is a different case because 
the lifting of all sanctions was triggered primarily by the practical need of cooperation with 
Pakistan after the September 11 events.  
The current Indian-Pakistani nuclear and conventional balances — even in the view of the 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear strategic communities — are still fundamentally unstable and 
asymmetrical. Although both South Asian rivals have apparently not assembled or stockpiled 
many operational nuclear weapons, they can create small nuclear armed forces in a short 
time. But they have not be able to acquire secure nuclear forces with a second-strike-
capability and an adequate as well as an effective command, control, communication and 
computer (C4I) and intelligence system as a fundamental prerequisite for a stable mutual 
deterrence relationship despite the fact that both sides have introduced some CBMs in 
regard to their nuclear forces. Given the lack of these factors, the failing transparency and 
confidence in each other’s command and control arrangements as well as dangers of crisis 
escalation in their bilateral relations, particularly over the Kashmir-conflict, their current 
nuclear postures still involve inherent risks of pre-emptive strikes, possibilities of accidents, 
unauthorized use, mishandling, misunderstanding and misperception. In both countries, the 
essential link between nuclear transparency, nuclear stability and a corresponding nuclear 
infrastructure with CBMs and early warning systems as past of the C4I structure has largely 
been overlooked in debates of nuclear deterrence and nuclear crisis management in the 
past.  
For the time being, the US policy towards Pakistan will focus that the country remains a 
moderate Islamic state and exert strong pressure on Islamabad to continue its policy of 
strategic restraint (such as cutting Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan). If India 
and Pakistan can be persuaded to restrain their nuclear capabilities and to increase CBMs, it 
would also help Washington to promote a broader proliferation agenda on a global scale. 
 
Nuclear Challenges of the North Korean Peninsula — Implications of September 11, 
2001 and the Iraq-Conflict 
Despite the focus of the Taiwan Strait conflict of the Bush-Administration before September 
11, 2001, North Korea has also been singled out as one of the most dangerous threats to US 
security not only because of its own continuing missile program, which in its current two-
stage configuration might be capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii and parts of the continental 
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United States, but also of its missile exports and technology transfers to South Asia and the 
Middle East. On October 4, 2002, North Korea surprisingly admitted that it is still conducting 
a nuclear weapons program despite the Geneva 1994 Agreed Framework and the KEDO 
program to build two light-water reactors in North Korea as a compensation for giving up its 
former nuclear weapons program. One year later, Pyongyang still defends aggressively its 
stance, raising concerns in the region and beyond that North Korea is becoming the next 
target of the US war on terrorism, its sponsors and WMD. Thus far, however, the Bush-
Administration has declared not to use military means as in the Iraq case but rather the 
diplomatic instrument.  
In January 2003, North Korea pulled out of the nuclear NPT and has restarted in the same 
month its mothballed reactor at Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang, by reprocessing of the 8,000 
spent fuel rods that they took out of storage. Although North Korea probably needs some 
time before it has sufficient highly-enriched uranium to make multiple nuclear warheads, it 
has sufficient plutonium to do so as well as to construct much less powerful radiological 
bombs to sell them to international terrorist groups.  
Meanwhile, the PRC appears also to have concluded that the DPRK obtained enough 
uranium from a second clandestine program to make several more devices. Only after China 
has become diplomatically more concerned and active on the Korean peninsula, North Korea 
has now agreed to join multilateral talks with the US, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia 
instead of insisting on bilateral talks with the U.S. China played an unusually active key-role 
in persuading Pyongyang because (1) it has more nuclear weapon states in its direct 
neighborhood (Russia, India, Pakistan and North Korea) than any other country in the world, 
(2) it is fearing that other Asian powers (such as Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan) could 
also opt for a nuclear weapon option in an escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula and (3) 
due to its increasing multifaceted economic, political and cultural ties wit South Korea. 
Hence, Beijing’s primary strategic interest is to keep stability on the Korean Peninsula in 
order to avoid undermining China’s own economic growth and to dissuade Washington to 
place too much military power in the region. However, even multilateral security talks do not 
mean automatically a more realistic solution to the nuclear weapon challenges of North 
Korea. Pyongyang may find all kinds of excuses for stalling the negotiations, whilst it is 
continuing to build nuclear weapons. 
As one of the lessons of the Iraq-conflict and the present nuclear questions concerning Iran’s 
nuclear programs are teaching, only full and free inspections that go substantially beyond the 
limited access hitherto could establish the full scope of any DPRK nuclear weapons program. 
Whether Pyongyang has already operational warheads (free falling bombs or those for its 
ballistic missiles) or whether Pyongyang is just blackmailing the international community, is 
open for discussion. But any inspection regime in North Korea similar to the one now that 
took place in Iraq before the US military intervention needs to include the fact that North 
Korea is believed to have not less than almost 12,000 caves in which a secret uranium 
enrichment program or a covert plutonium effort can be hidden. Unlike in Iraq, where 
intrusive inspections had been conducted between 1991 and 1998, there had been only one 
routine inspection of Pyongyang’s declared facilities — and that was conducted over a 
decade ago. A “fully, verifiable and irreversible” dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program — as the Bush administration is demanding — means nothing less than of 
almost total transparency of the politically closest country today. 
Furthermore, regardless of a future verification regime for North Korea, Pyongyang has 
demanded three conditions for any peaceful settlement of the new crisis:  
(1) the U.S. needs to recognize the DPRK’s sovereignty; 
(2) Washington assures the DPRK of non-aggression and 
(3) The U.S. does not hinder the economic development of the DPRK. 
While these North Korean conditions can be fulfilled in one or another way, it remains 
uncertain whether Pyongyang really cooperates with the IAEA in regard to a comprehensive 
inspection regime and will give up its newly revealed nuclear weapons program. As some 
commentators and experts have pointed out, the nuclear issue will not be solved except in 
the context of a broad Korean settlement, in which all the regional powers must be involved 
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in one or another way. But North Korea has also more cards to play than just the nuclear 
one. It is theoretically not excluded at all that it will give up its nuclear weapons program after 
a lengthy and frustrating negotiation process with the US. But it might have no interests at all  
the release the military pressure on South Korea at its common border given its overriding 
regime interests to survive and maintain some leverage towards Seoul and the US. Hitherto 
North Korea has not honored any international agreements and treaties and will, therefore, 
hardly rely on any peace treaty with the US as a real security treaty guarantee not being 
attacked by the US after the Iraq conflict has been solved in one or another way. Hence, it 
seems very questionable whether Pyongyang will give up not just its nuclear weapons 
program but also its chemical and biological weapons arsenal. 
Furthermore, even US attempts to use the weapon of economic sanctions in order to push 
North Korea to give up it s nuclear weapons program is controversial, risky and not 
guaranteed to succeed. It might result in the opposite what Washington tries to achieve: 
undermining further North’s Korea economy and social situations that can lead to a collapse 
and widespread unrest. But it is also uncertain whether North Korea plays on time. It may 
also have defined the successful military intervention in Iraq in a way very differently what we 
think in the West: North Korea may rely on nuclear weapons even more in the future than 
before the Iraq conflict.  
Until now, North Korea did not promise to suspend its nuclear program nor did it mention of 
receiving IAEA inspectors. For the time being, only the newly established six-party talks may 
offer a realistic framework for the coming months and years. But at the end of even those 
cooperative policies towards Pyongyang, all unresolved issues ultimately boil down to the 
North Korean regime interests and its survival that might hinder a peaceful “great solution” 
for the Korean peninsula. Although the hard-line and rather confrontational approach of the 
Bush Administration has also complicated a peaceful solution of the unresolved security 
problems on the Korean peninsula during the last two years, at the same time, the ability of 
North Korea to play diplomatic games or conducting blackmail policies on security issues has 
narrowed considerably during the last two years. Moreover, Washington’s new Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at stopping the flow of WMD, has also increased the pressure 
on North Korea albeit containing the export and import of WMD materials and technologies 
can never be guaranteed to 100 percent. 
The recent agreement to multilateral talks can also give Pyongyang new opportunities to 
drive wedges between the other five states and to split them apart in the new multilateral 
forum. Although all of these five states agree that North Korea has to give up its nuclear 
weapons, they disagree what the United States and others should offer and what kind of 
compensations they have to give to North Korea. Any common coercive policies of the U.S. 
which need to be backed by the other four states are highly uncertain in this context. The first 
round of talks should directed to the threat of nuclear and missile proliferation rather than 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons themselves. But taking into account the interests and 
ramifications of all six actors, one can hardly be very optimistic as Robert Einhorn, a former 
senior nonproliferation official at the State Department, has recently stated: 
“With the North Korean’s sounding increasingly as if they are determined to acquire and 
retain nuclear weapons, and the deeply divided Bush administration ambivalent at best about 
reaching an agreement with a regime it considers untrustworthy and repugnant, there is little 
basis for optimism about the next round of Beijing talks.” 
 
Nuclear Terrorism 
Although many international security experts today are also overstating and exaggerating the 
scope of the terrorist use of WMD, most security experts have rather tended to downplay the 
threat of WMD terrorism for many years, despite the Aum Shinrykio case of 1995, for 
basically two reasons: (1) relatively few terrorist groups seem to be interested in inflicting 
mass casualties. (2) even those groups are facing substantial technical hurdles that would 
have to be overcome for terrorists to use those weapons. But the new level of dedication and 
fanaticism by giving their lives in an attack. Furthermore, they are well educated, organized 
 10
and trained for their mission and use their university education to use their knowledge for 
their terrorist attacks. In the age of globalisation, they operate in an international environment 
in very small, often independent cells and networks which are difficult to enter from outside 
by Western intelligence circles. The network and association with a state (if not state 
sponsorship) offered access to production facilities and know-how (such as biological and 
chemical substances) that would the acquisition more easy, allowing those terrorist groups to 
narrow the technical hurdles to acquiring a WMD capability. And while the “loose nukes”-
scenario of tactical nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union has received wide 
international publicity, it is much less acknowledged the enormous stocks of unsecured 
biological and chemical weapons(BW and CW). But given the Western unpreparedness, the 
effects of BW on a target population too, would be extremely hard to counter. 
According to many international terrorist experts, there is also an increasing congruence 
between a number of states that support international terrorism and states that have WMD 
programs despite the fact that there is hitherto no clear connection between the regime of 
Saddam Hussein and the Bin-Laden networks. Furthermore, even terrorist groups carrying 
out small attack with chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons could cause a very 
severe psychological impact — the latter is even more important than the level of violence 
itself.  Another very troubling scenario is the concrete prospect how fundamentalism and 
religious intolerance can easily be politically manipulated as we see in particular in the 
Middle East as well as in Indonesia. 
Given these new security challenges — particularly non-state sponsored international 
terrorism —, no traditional arms control and non-proliferation efforts are existing because 
they are almost all directed towards state-sponsored proliferation of WMD. This is one of 
those areas where many states have adopted more forcefully into some fluid mix of 
deterrence and defense in terms of dealing with a wide array of threats associated with 
WMD. 
 
Conclusions and Prospects 
Although the US-Russian cooperation has been broadened in the aftermath of the terrorists 
attacks, this process only reinforces already existing trends. I don’t think that the new 
institutional cooperation in anti-terrorist operations are sufficient to fundamentally change the 
nature of the future U.S.-Russian relationship in the short-term and mid-term perspective. 
The pattern related to SORT and the ABM treaty was already quite clear before the terrorists 
attacks on September 11, 2001. Both sides have established various “channels for joint 
cooperation in recent years that is unprecedented by Cold War standards and goes beyond 
the strict formalistic approach of negotiated arms control treaties”  (Rose Goettemoeller). 
Moving from strategic Offense to strategic defense as well as cooperation on missile defense 
technologies (Russian-American Observation Satellite/RAMOS program to develop early-
warning satellite technology that could applied to a missile defense system) can be seen as 
characteristic forums of the new strategic era of the U.S.-Russian relationship in the 21st 
century. 
As already the experiences of the START and INF-treaties as well as the Iraq-conflict have 
demonstrated, those regimes and treaties need effective verification mechanisms such as 
coercive UN inspections, including ad-hoc and on-site inspections and portal as well as 
perimeter monitoring which are all very challenging by themselves. Given the manifold 
contradictory strategic trends, neither missile defense nor missile arms control should be 
seen solely as the ultimate security solution. It is rather the contrast: both should be viewed 
as complementary approaches in international security. A strong missile non-proliferation 
regime can reduce the costs of defense and thus serve as another safety net or an additional 
option against missiles; an effective missile defense system is the last defense line or safety 
police against those missile states that are unwilling to sign the MTCR or the ICCBM, but 
willing to use them for political ends. Given the wide range of future threat scenarios linked 
with old and new proliferation of WMD and the lessons to learn from September 11, 2001, 
the international community and their nation states cannot pull all their security eggs in one 
 11
basket and then abruptly pull them out and put them in another basket when the situation it 
demands. 
The World Community has to come up not just with acceptable, but also more effective 
solutions to the most important international security challenges that have emerged through  
intensive consultations and negotiations no matter how difficult and time consuming they are. 
This is in  particular acute and important for security challenges linked with the so-called 
“secondary proliferators” such as North Korea1, Iran and Pakistan who have established 
themselves net distribution networks to other potential states or even international terrorist 
groups seeking WMD technologies to circumvent existing non-proliferation regimes to obtain 
the materials and equipment needed to develop WMD. 
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